Glossary
A B C D
E F G H I
J K L M N
O P Q R S
T U V W X
Y Z
As an effort to facilitate discussion, and to educate new members, we are constructing
this glossary of terms and concepts. Anyone is welcome to comment on the terms and
concepts as well as define them, but please cite references whenever used. New entries
will be added if you make sure you isolate them in the message and indicate that you want
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- A
- Algebraic Topology
- The branch of topology which uses algebraic symbols for encoding
spatial relations. It includes graph theory and therefore is a basis for all of
network theory. It is also the basis for vector calculus and network theory and
vector calculus are brought together in a wonderful paper by Franklin H. Branin Jr.:
"The algebraic-topological basis for network analogies and the vector calculus."
in Proceedings of the Symposium on Generalized Networks, Polytechnic Institute of
Brooklyn, 1966. [Don Mikulecky, Dec 21, 2000]
- Algorithm:
- A process with five attributes [Source: Knuth, D.E., The Art of Computer Programming,
2nd Edition, Vol. 1, Addison Wesley (Reading), 1973, pp. 4-6.]. (1) It terminates
after a finite number of steps. (2) Each step is unambiguously defined. (3) It
has zero or more input data. (4) It has one or more output data. (5)It must be
effective; there must be a Turing-machine equivalent. For example, there is no
algorithm that solves the Busy Beaver problem [Steve
Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000].
- Anticipatory System
- {From taped interview: July,
1997}
- RR: Well, "anticipation", the way I use the term, is a style of control. And
it's based, not as cybernetic systems are on a deviation from a desired behavior,
anticipation is based on having a predictive model of the system you're trying to control
and using the predicted behavior to generate the control which will modify the behavior in
a desired way. The combination of the free system that you want to control and a control
based on such a model, predictive model... its behavior is what I call an
"anticipatory system".
-
- Other definitions:
-
- A system in which change is due, in part, to the systems predictive models of the
future.[Tom Staiger, Dec. 21, 2000]. The model used by the system is a model of its world. It is used to govern present behavior in
"anticipation" of future events based on predictions from its
model. It is a clear example of fourth cause or final cause.
[Don Mikulecky, Dec. 21, 2000, Jan. 5, 2001]
- I think it is better to say in "prediction" of future events. Prediction takes
place in the present and can be right or wrong. It results in anticipation when the model
commutes with reality. So a system is anticipatory not only because it has a predictive
model, but because it has the ability to refine that model so that it commutes somewhat
reliably. Does this help avoid defining in terms of the same word? [John Kinneman, Dec.
21, 2000]
- I like this, since it is short
and to the point, but I worry how "predictive models of the future" is cashed
out so as to avoid
reference to anticipation. Might be impossible, but best if avoided if possible. Thoughts?
[John Collier, Dec. 22, 2000]
- Predict: Foretell on the basis of observation, experience, or scientific reason.
- Anticipate: To forsee and deal
with in advance. To act before.
- (From Webster) .[Don Mikulecky, Jan. 3 & 5, 2001]
-
- Aristotian Causes
- Aristotle formulated a thesis that the task of science is to study the "why of
things," and went on to say that there a four different ways of answering the
question: Material Cause, Efficient Cause,
Formal Cause, and Final Cause.
- Aristotelian causality:
- Four classes of answers to the question, "Why did the event occur?" The four
classes are material,efficient, formal, and final. Aristotle presumed that there were no
uncaused effects, and that all effects are the result of a controlled
transformation. Reductionism only admits material, formal and efficient cause, and
keeps them separated. Complex systems are driven by all four classes, and they are
inseparable.[Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000].
- Autopoietic Unity
- Something distinct from its surrounds (a unity) that has the property that its only
product is itself. There is no separation between producer and product. {Note the
closeness to closed to efficient cause and the necessity of a boundary, DCM}
- From Maturana & Varela, The Tree of Life (1987) pp 48-49. [Don
Mikulecky, Jan. 5, 2001].
-
- B
-
- Busy Beaver Problem:
- The Busy Beaver problem is the problem of finding B(n), the maximum number of ones that
a Turing machine with n states and an alphabet of {1, B} will write to an initially blank
tape. Classic example of an incomputable probelm. [Source: Rosen, Kenneth, Discrete
mathematics and its applications, 4th Edition, WCB/McGraw-Hill, (Boston),1999, pp.
666-674.] [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000].
- C
- Category Theory
- "The first presentation of the theory of categories which was at all definitive was
by Eilenberg and MacLane in 1954. Allthough originally developed to treat certain
problems in algebraic topology (giving rise to a new
branch of mathematics called homological algebra) it has become, after a slow start, one
of the major unifying influences in mathematics. It does not seem to be generally
appreciated, though, that the theory of categories is a natural tool in any science which
involves the use of model systems or abstractions of any type. Indeed this is
precisely what algebraic topology is all about: the study of a topological or
geometric object in terms of a sequence of of abstract algebraic models or images of
it. Thus, algebraic totpology occupies the same position, within mathematics itself,
as does the building of mathematical models to understand physical or biological systems
outside of mathematics." from Rosen's 1972 paper : "Some Relational Cell Models:
The Metabolism-Repair System." Chapter 4 of Foundations of Mathematical Biology
Vol. 2,
217-253. N.Y. & London, Academic Press. [Don Mikulecky, Dec 21, 2000]
- Causal Entailment:
- A causal linkage. The
relationship p causes q, where p and q are events in ontological reality is an instance of
causal entailment. The basis for all of our "rational" thought rests on the
belief that such relationships exist between events in the world. It is not a random
situation.
- Cellular Automata
- Church-Turing Hypothesis:
- Partial recursive functions are the only computable functions, and these are the
functions computable by Turing
Machines. Unproven; rests on the definition of "computable".
-
- Strong Church-Turing: every finitely realizable physical system can be
perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by
finite means. Unproven, but based on a quantum-mechanical universal
machine, which may or may not be the same thing as a Turing Machine.
Weak Church-Turing: any effectively specifiable processes is computable by
a Turing machine.[Tom Holyrod, Dec. 22, 2000]
- Closed under Efficent Cause
- This closure is a unique way of ending an infinite progression of causal entailments.
The machine is distinct from the organism in just this way. In simple language, it
means that organisms have their "builder" internalized and need not be made by
something else. This idea has been embodied in the cell theory for some time: Living
cells come from other living cells. It is the spirit of Maturana and Varellas
"autopoietic unity". [Don Mikulecky, Dec. 20, 2000]
- Comparative Compleity, Degrees of Complexity, etc.
- The use of some "measure" of complexity to classify and categorize the formal
systems used on the right hand side of the modeling relation or models themselves. [Don Mikulecky, Jan. 8, 2001]
- Complexity
- {From taped interview: July,
1997}
- RR: Well that's a little bit harder to describe. Complexity is really recognized by the
failure of all our attempts to deal simply with these systems. Simplicity is easier
to define. I define a system to be simple if it has certain properties and anything else
is a system that isn't simple; I call "complex". Simplicity is one of the things
we inherited from physics; a philosophy of science: all systems can be broken up in a
certain canonical set of ways and all systems are built up out of pieces that arise from
such decompositions, again in a certain canonical set of ways.So, a system is simple if
you can take it apart in a familiar fashion or put it together from pieces in a familiar
fashion. That's what basically itmeans for a system to be simple. The whole idea behind
physics was that all systems were simple. And that's the way science progresses, by
finding the right pieces and the right ways of putting the pieces back together. The
lesson I bring from biology is that most systems, MOST systems are not even simple. Most
systems are more like organisms. There's no one fixed set of parts into which they can all
be decomposed...
-
- Other definitions:
-
- Complexity is the property of a real world system that is manifest in the inability of
any one formalism being adequate to capture all its properties. It requires that we find
distinctly different ways of interacting with systems. Distinctly different in the sense
that when we make successful models, the formal systems needed to describe each distinct
aspect are NOT derivable from each other.[Don Mikulecky, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Computable process:
- Can be replaced with an equivalent Turing machine. Congruent with sequentially causal
natural systems. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- I'd be careful with that last sentence. Defining computability in terms of Turing
computability is equivalent to Church-Turing (delete the "Congruent with..."
sentence.)[Tom Holyrod, Dec. 22, 2000]
- Computational Science:
- An academic discipline that assumes that processes of life and mind are computable.
[Source:Dr.Istvan Berkeley, a Cognitive Scientist] [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Constructivism
- The approach to knowledge based on the idea that there is no passive way to obtain
knowledge. The observer is always an active participant. Rosen's Modeling
Relation captures this very well especially as developed in detail in Anticipatory
Systems. Subjectivity is recognized and incorporated in any knowledge seeking
activity. The "reality" we can achieved is always a construct, no matter
how strongly it is grounded in sensory "data". Data by itself, without
interpretation via the modeling relation is useless. [Don Mikulecky, Dec. 20, 2000]
- Church's Thesis
- The assertion that causal entailments in the external world must conform to some notion
of effectiveness which can be contained within a given formal system. It equates
effectiveness with computability by insisting that everything meaningful can be reduced to
syntax and dealt with algorithmicly. Anything not conforming to this requirement is
defined out of the realm of effectiveness. The Gödel Incompleteness Theorem can be
interpreted as a refutation of this thesis. Controversy arises around this due to
the restrictive interpretations placed on Gödel's theorem by some who believe it is
only justifiably applied to mathematics and not the physical world.[Don Mikulecky, Dec.
20, 2000]
-
- Cybernetics:
- The "art of steersmanship," Its principles apply whether the thing being
steered is a mechanism or an organism [Source: Ashby, W.R., An Introduction to
Cybernetics, Third Impression, John Wiley and Sons (New York), 1958, pp.1-5.]. Ashby's
concept of cybernetic complexity requires closed or impredicative loops of causality.
[Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- D
- E
- Effect:
- In Aristotelian causality, that which is caused.
Phenotypical behavior. An event resulting from the interaction of Aristotelian causes. That which is transformed from material
cause. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Efficient Cause
- In Aristotelian causality, the law governing the
transformation of a material cause into an effect. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Not to be TOO picky, but has anybody compared the modern definitions of the words
"effective" and "efficient"? 'Efficient' used to mean what
"effective" still means, and "effective" doesn't carry the 'least
amount of work' baggage. I think "effective cause" is clearer. [Tom Holyrod,
Dec. 22, 2000]
-
- Entailment
- The answer to a "why?" question about some event or entity in nature.
Answered in terms of the Aristotelian "becauses".
-
- Epistemology
- The study of the causal underpinings of system behavior, that is , the reason why it
changes state the way it does. In living systems, their "physiology". [Don
Mikulecky, Jan. 9, 2001 {based on Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, pp 313}]
- F
- Fabricated vs. Physiology
- Final Cause
- In Aristotelian causality, the function for which an event occurs. Not admissable in
reductionist science. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Formal Cause
- In Aristotelian causality, constrains the form of the event. Typically parametric or
genotypic description of phenotypic effect. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Frozen Cell Problem
- Functional Component
- Functional component: [Source: Rosen, R.] The difference between the two complex systems
defines the "functional component." The difference between the behaviors of the
two complex systems defines the function. In a complex system, a component with a function
is the unit of organization. A functional component is context dependent. It has inputs,
both from the larger system of which it is a component, and the environment of the larger
system. It also has outputs, both to the larger system, and the environment. If the
environment, A, changes, then the function of the component, B, changes. A can typically
be described by a family of mappings that carries a set (the range X, where xÎX) to
another set (the domain Y, where yÎY), such that, y = a(x), or more formally, A: X ® Y.
B can typically be described by another family of mappings that carries a set (the range
U, where uÎU) to another set (the domain V, where vÎV), such that, v = b(u), or more
formally, B: U ® V. The functionality, F, of the functional component can be described as
a mapping that maps a domain set of mappings (A, where mapping aÎA) to a range set of
mappings, (B, where mapping bÎB), such that b = f(a), or F: A ® B. [Steve Kercel, Dec.
19, 2000]
- G
-
- Generic
- A property of a mathematical object is often called generic if a sufficiently
small but otherwise arbitrary perturbation of the object produces another object with the
same property. In other words, if something is generic with respect to a given
property, it is to that extent indistinguishable from any of its immediate neighbors.
When we use mathematical language to image the material word through the modeling
relation we tend to deal with the nongeneric. Conservation laws, symmetry
conditions, and the like dominate mathematical physics, for example and they are strongly
nongeneric. So too are the material systems which these languages describe.
- Examples:
- 1) It is generic for a real number to be irrational; it is nongeneric
for a number to be rational, or even to be computable in the usual sense.
- 2) It is generic for two lines in a plane to intersect; it is
nongeneric for them to coincide or be parallel.
- 3) It is generic for a differential form to be nonexact or
nonintegrable.
- 4) It is generic for sets to be infinite.
- Generic properties are what we expect to see when we approach something in an objective,
unbiased way. Nevertheless, by any objective criterion, it is the rational
numbers that are rare and our predalection for them tells us more than about numbers.
{from: Essays on Life itself, pp 148,175, and 326}.
-
-
-
- Gödel's Theorm
- No matter how one tries to formalize a particular part of math, syntactic truth in the
formalization is narrower than the set of truths about numbers. (Rosen, 7) It shows that there are truths that mathematics
cannot prove.
- H
- Halting Problem
- I
- Impredicative:
- A set of objects X is impredicative if and only if there exists a property, P(x), of an
object xÎX, where X is the set of objects possessing property P(x).[Source: Kleene, S.C.,
Introduction to Metamathematics, vanNostrand , Princeton, 1950, p. 42.] In other
words, an impredicative object participates in its own definition. Impredicativity is not
an appeal to circular logic. Circular
logic is an attempt in formal logic to use a proposition to prove itself. In contrast,
impredicative definitions (such as the definition of the least upper bound of a bounded
set of real numbers), use closed loops of inferential entailment to create an implicit
definition. Impredicativities are despised by mathematicians but are tolerated because
they are indispensable in mathematics. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Incomputable process:
- No Turing machine can be found that will replace the process. Congruent with closed-loop
non-material causality in natural systems. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- No proof of congruence is known. Could be just computationally irreduceable.[Tom
Holyrod, Dec. 22, 2000]
-
- Inferential entailment:
- Logical implication. The relationship p implies q, where p and q are propositions is an
instance of inferential entailment. [Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
-
- J
- K
- L
- Linkage
- The dependence of the dynamics of one system on the dynamics of another.
Life
- The ontological relationship between function and realization that makes something
complex.[John Kinneman, Jan. 8, 2001] {Ed.'s note: John has picked up on a
point about which Rosen seems ambiguous . This assertion is based on Rosen's
identification of "complex" with the "real world" (Personal
communication, 1997) and the nesting of "organism" into the class of
complex things. "All living things are complex but all complex things are not
living". However, he also says the following in the taped interview from 1997: (JR is
his daughter Judith)
-
- "JR: Well, your goal all along has been to understand why living things are alive.
RR: Yeah. What makes something live? That is really the great mystery in all of science,
in all of nature, and in all of thought.
JR: So can you sum that up by saying that the reason they are alive is because they are
complex enough to be alive?
RR: I feel that complexity is almost another way of saying these systems are alive.
JR: They achieve a certain level of complexity and life is an emergent property of that
complexity?
RR: Yeah. I would... That's a fair statement."
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is from Howard H. Pattee
Questioner: What do you consider the necessary conditions
for life?
Rosen: What you have to have, at least in so far as we
formalize our intuitions about organisms, are modes of coupling with the world
which can be regarded as metabolic; we must have inputs from the world, typical
material inputs that supply energy and which provide the capacity for renewing
the structure of the organism, whatever it might be. . . And you also have to
have a kind of genetic apparatus, something which carries information, which
tells how the parts which the metabolic part of the system produces shall be
assembled, both to renew the substance of the organism, and also as a separate
function, to reproduce it. I think anything that we would want to call alive
would have to have at least these two basic functions: the function of
metabolism and what I call the genetic function. ["A Question of Physics:
Conversations in Physics and Biology" P. Buckley and D. Peat, eds., Univ.
of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 89]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Living
- This is here to invite comment. Some of the group strongly recommend that we
recognize living as a property broader than those possesed by organisms.
For starters, I go to Maturana and Varela "The Tree of life":
"Ontogeny is the history of structural changes in a particular living being. ... it
is born in a particular place, in a medium that constitutes the ambience in which it
emerges and in which it interacts. This ambiance appears to have a structural
dynamics of its own, *operationally distinct* from the living being....Between them there
is a necesary structural congruence (or the unity
disappears)."
- M
- Material Cause
- In Aristotelian causality, the object that serves as the source of the transformation.
The thing that was transformed into an effect.[Steve Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Measurement:
- Mapping of an ontologiical event to an epistemological proposition. Independent of
either formal or natural system. Must be discovered independently of either. Cannot
typically be determined by inverting the prediction mapping. Together with prediction,
constitutes World 2 in Popper's 3-world philosophy of science. Together with prediction,
the connection between the formal and natural systems in Rosen's modeling relation.[Steve
Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
- Measurement Problem
- Meme
- Here are a series of definitions classified according to Richard Brodie's book: Virus
of the Mind
- Biological definition:
- "A unit of cultural inheritance, hypothesized as analogous to the particulate gene,
and as naturally selected by virtue of its 'phenotypic' consequences on its own survival
and replication in the cultural environment" Dawkins, The Extended
Phenotype (1982) [Andrew Gonzalez, Jan. 4, 2001]
- Dawkins, "The selfish gene" pp192-201 "The new soup is the soup
of human culture. We need a name for a new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a
unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of *immitation*"[Don Mikulecky, Jan. 4,
2001]
- Psychological definition: (from Plotkin)
- The unit of cultural heredity analogous to the gene. It is the internal
representation of knowledge.[Don Mikulecky, Jan. 4, 2001]
-
-
- Model
- A model is a particular case of the Modeling Relation which commutes. That is it is a
successful encoding of a percept (our mind's "image" of a causal event in the real world) into a formal system, the use of that
formal system to "explain" the causal event in the real world, and a decoding
back to the real world to compare and confirm the congruence between the implication
in the formal system and the causal event in nature. [Don Mikulecky, Dec.21, 2000]
- N
- O
- Ontology:
- The study of events occurring in reality. World 1 in Popper's 3-world philosophy of
science. Presumes that there is a reality in which events might occur. Comparable to
natural system in Rosen modeling relation. [Steve Kercel, Dec.19, 2000] The reason
why a system has come to have the identity it does. In simple systems this can be reduced
to the systems epistemology, but not in complex systems.
In complex systems it is generally necessary to go to larger systems for the
reasons for a given system's existence.[Don Mikulecky, Jan. 9, 2001 {based on Rosen, Essays
on Life Itself, pp 313}]
- Organism:
- It is a bounded process, it includes subprocesses of metabolism and repair, and is
closed to efficient cause. There is no presumption of specific chemical makeup, and no
limits on behavior other than the necessity of including those just listed.[Tom Staiger,
Dec. 19, 2000]
A question: Is something more also needed? Does this definition of
organism handle the necessary role of environment as context for organism? Or does
efficient closure, by itself, still leave an organism separate from its environment?
Perhaps some other entailments are necessary to capture the environmental context and
meanings conferred thereby. I think closure to final cause would do that, because purpose,
meaning, function (as an organism)are all context-derived, I think. I would guess that
without such an organizing relationship with the larger system (environment/context) it
can't exist as an organism.[John J Kineman, Dec. 19, 2000]
A comment: The efficient cause closure is a unique reqirement.The environment does not
provide this.The environment provides material cause as it would for any machine.This may
be, in part, contextual, but it also is true that the organism is an autopoietic unity at the same time. [Maturana &
Varella]. There are all four causes involved here in complex ways. Efficient cause , by
being closed, is what makes the distinction. The need for interaction with the ecosystem,
etc. is a entwining of final causes which I would hardly describe as closure. [Don
Mikulecky, Dec. 19,2000]
- P
- Positivism
- Prediction:
- Mapping of an epistemological proposition to an ontological event. Independent of either
formal or natural system. Must be discovered independently of either. Cannot typically be
determined by inverting the measurement mapping. Together with measurement, constitutes
World 2 in Popper's 3-world philosophy of science. Together with measurement , the
connection between the formal and natural systems in Rosen's modeling relation. [Steve
Kercel, Dec. 19, 2000]
-
- Q
- R
- Relational Biology
- A term introduced by Nicholas Rashevsky in his 1954 paper : "Topology and life: In
search of general mathematical principles in biology and sociology", Bull.Math.
Biophys. 16: 317-348. Later adopted by his student, Robert Rosen, who developed it into an approach to some of
the most important problems in biology. Rosen used category theory as his way of
creating models of a kind never done before. His use of M,R systems as relational
models paved the way to a dichotomous distinction between machines and organisms.
[Don Mikulecky, Dec 21, 2000]
- S
- T
- Topology
- The branch of mathematics concerned with geometrical features that remain unchanged
after twisting, stretching, and other deformations which do not actually cut the space.
Sometimes called "rubber sheet geometry". It is the study of how
systems are connected together and in that way it is the means for studying relationships
between things.[Don Mikulecky, Dec 21, 2000]
- Turing Machine
- Turing Test
- U
- Universal Turing Machine
- V
- W
- X,Y,Z
Glossary reposted for new additions, comments, etc. December 18, 2000.
Don Mikulecky
Complexity Research Group